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Summary : Let T denote a continuous time horizon and {G f : teT} be a net
(generalized sequence) of Bayesian games. We show that: (i) if
{x t : teT} is a net of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) strategies for G*
,
we can extract a subsequence which converges to a full information BNE
strategy for a one shot full information Bayesian game. (ii) Given a
full information BNE strategy of a one shot full information Bayesian
game we can find a net of BNE strategies {x*: teT} in {G t : teT} which
converges to the full information BNE strategy of the one shot game.
Moreover, we show that (i) and (ii) hold even with bounded rational
players, i.e., instead of the net {x t : teT} in (i) and (ii) being a BNE
strategy for {G t : teT}, it can now be an approximate or e
t
~BNE strategy.
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Kahn, Stefan Krasa, Gregory Michalopoulos, Wayne Shafer, Bart Taub, and
Anne Villamil for several useful discussions. As always, we are
responsible for any shortcomings. The financial support of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Campus Research Board is
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1 . INTRODUCTION
The definition of a Bayesian game and the notion of Bayesian
rationality (or Bayesian Nash equilibrium) [see for instance Aumann
(1987, p. 6)] are given as follows:
Let (£l,J, /j) be a probability measure space and Y be a linear
topological space. A Bayesian game G = { (X-,u-, /• ,\x) : i=l, 2, ...,n} is a
set of quadruples where
(1) X- : 0. -* 2 Y is the random strategy correspondence of
player 1 i,
n
(2) Ui : Q x ] [ Yj - R is the random payoff function of player i,
j-i
(3) / is the private information of player i, which is a
partition of (fi,/), and
(4) |i is a probability measure on (ft,/) denoting the common prior
of each player.
n
A Bayesian Nash Eguilibrium (BNE) for G is a function x: Q -
] [ Y i such
i=l
that each x-: Q -» Y- is /--measurable x^u) e X-(o)) /j-a.e. and for all i,
J
u i (o),x((o) )d|i (w) ^ |u1 («,x1 (»),...,xi.1 ((i>),y1 ,xltl ((i)),... lxn ((i)))d|i((i)) for
any /--measurable function y - : Q -* Y-, y^u) e X-(u) /j-a.e.
Consider now the above game in a dynamic framework. Specifically,
let T be the set {1,2,...} denoting the time horizon . Denote by a(u-,X-)
the a-algebra that the random payoff function and the random strategy
set of player i generate. This is the initial information of player i.
1 Notice that in Aumann (1987) X
1
- is a fixed set and doesn't depend
on the states of nature. The present framework is more general and
reduces to that of Aumann simply by setting for each uefi, the set Xj(&))
to be equal to a constant subset Z^ of Y. Also note that 2 Y denotes the
set of all non-empty subsets of Y.
At any given point in time t in T the private information set of
player i is defined as:
<
1 - 1 ) 9\ = a(u i ,X i ,x t
- 1
,x t
-2
, ...)
where xl ,x ,... are past period Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies.
In other words the private information of a player i at any given point
in time consists of his/her initial information a(u-,X-) together with
the information that BNE strategies generated in all previous periods,
i.e., t-l,t-2,.... Note that in this setting in period t+1 the private
information set of player i will be, &X* 1 = &\ V o(x c ), (where a(x r ) is
the information that the BNE strategy x
t
generated at period t and
«^iVo(x c ) denotes the "join," i.e., the smallest o-algebra containing
ST. and a(x t )). Hence, for each player i and each time period t we have
that:
y\ c yf1 c 9\' 2 c ... .
The above expression represents a learning process for player i and it
generates a sequence of Bayesian games {G t : teT} defined as above where
the private information set of each player is given by (1.1). In other
words, in period t each player's strategy is based on the initial
information as well as the information that BNE strategies generated in
the previous periods. In this setting agents behave myopically, i.e.,
they do not form expectations over the entire future horizon but only
for the current period, i.e., their expected payoff is based on the
current period private information. Since the private information set
of each player becomes finer from period to period, the expected payoff
of each player is changing from period to period as a result of the new
acquired information. Note that in this scenario the learning process
for a player is a direct consequence of observing the BNE strategies
from period to period and refining his/her private information. In this
setting, clearly the information that the equilibrium strategy generates
at a given time t in T, will effect the equilibrium outcome in
subsequent periods, e.g., t + 1, t+2, .... Let us now denote the one shot
full information game by G = { (X- , Uj ,7- , jj ) : i=l,2,...,n} where F. is the
pooled information of player i over the entire horizon, i.e.,
•^i
= V
«^i • Since any BNE strategy for each player i in the game G has
the property that it is V ^-measurable, we call such a Bayesian Nash
c-i
equilibrium strategy as a full information BNE strategy.
The basic questions that this paper addresses are the following:
(i) If {G* : t=l,2,...} is a sequence of Bayesian games and x t is a
sequence of BNE strategies for the game G*, can we extract a subsequence
which converges to a full information BNE strategy for the game G? In
other words, will the learning process described above eventually lead
to a full information BNE strategy?
(ii) Given a full information BNE strategy for the full
information game G can we find a sequence of BNE strategies x 1 in G*
which converges to the full information BNE strategy? Roughly speaking,
can we approximate (or reach) a full information BNE strategy by a
sequence of BNE strategies? Alternatively, given a full information BNE
strategy is there a path of BNE strategies that it will lead there?
(iii) If {G 1 : t=l,2,...} is a sequence of Bayesian games and x t is a
sequence of approximate or e
t
~BNE strategies for the game G* can we
still extract a subsequence which converges to a full information BNE
strategy for the game G? Moreover, can we reach a full information BNE
strategy by a sequence of approximate or £
t
~BNE strategies? In other
words, can we obtain the counterparts of questions (i) and (ii) for the
case of an approximate or e
t
-BNE which may be viewed respectively, as
bounded rational learning will converge to the full information BNE and
that the full information BNE can be reached by a path of plays with
bounded rational players (i.e., players find "nearly" optimal
responses)
.
We provide a positive answer to the above questions. Note that
roughly speaking (i) and (ii) may be viewed respectively as a kind of
upper semicontinuity and lower semicontinuity of the BNE correspondence.
It should be pointed out that aspects of question (i) have already
been addressed by several authors, notably Feldman (1987), Jordan
(1991), Nyarko (1992) [see also the excellent survey of Blume and Easley
(1992)], but in a different setting. In particular, we don't require
each player's strategy set to be finite, we have a continuum of states,
we allow for continuous time and the convergence is not in probability
as it is the case in the Feldman (1987), Jordan (1991) and Nyarko (1992)
papers. The continuous time setting that we allow makes our results
interesting to the Finance literature where continuous time models are
particularly attractive. To the best of our knowledge, questions (ii)
and (iii) are addressed for the first time.
A few comments on the methodology. In view of the fact that we
allow for continuous time and a continuum of states, one needs to work
with strategies which form a net (generalized sequence) in an infinite
dimensional strategy space. The compactness and continuity arguments in
this framework are not straightforward and some rather non-elementary
functional analytic results seem to be required. We have collected most
of the results needed for our proofs in Section 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 3 and 4
contain the main results of the paper, i.e., convergence and
approximation theorems for games with mixed and pure strategy Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. The proofs of all our results are given in Section 5.
2. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
2 . 1 Notation
Mn denotes the n-fold Cartesian product of the set of real
numbers R.
R++ denotes the strictly positive elements of R.
con A denotes the convex hull of the set A.
con A denotes the closed convex hull of the set A.
2A denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of the set A.
(3 denotes the empty set.
/ denotes set theoretic subtraction.
If A c x, where X is a Banach space, cl A denotes the norm closure
of A.
2.2 Definitions
Let T and X be sets. The graph of the set-valued function (or
correspondence), <J> : T -» 2 X is denoted by G^ = {(t,y) e TxX: y e 4>(t)}.
Let now (T,t,ij) be a complete, finite measure space,, and X be a
separable Banach space. The correspondence <J) : T -» 2 X is said to have a
measurable graph if G^ e t « B(X), where B(X) denotes the Borel
a-algebra on X and ® denotes product a-algebra. The correspondence
4> : T -» 2 X is said to be lower measurable if for every open subset V of
X, the set {t e T: <t>(t) D V * 0} is an element of t. Recall [see
Debreu (1966), p. 359] that if 4> : T -» 2 X has a measurable graph, then <j)
is lower measurable. Furthermore, if <!>(•) is closed valued and lower
measurable then <(> : T -» 2 X has a measurable graph. A result of Aumann
(1967) says that if (T,t,/j) is a complete, finite measure space, X is a
separable metric space and <J> : T -» 2 X is a nonempty valued
correspondence having a measurable graph, then <j> ( * ) admits a measurable
selection , i.e, there exists a measurable function f: T -» X such that
f(t) e 4>(t) /j-a.e.
We now define the notion of a Bochner integrable function. We
will follow closely Diestel-Uhl (1977). Let (T,t,jj) be a finite measure
space and X be a Banach space. A function f: T -» X is called simple if
n
there exist x
1
,x
2
,.,x in X and a./CCy,-,** in r such that f = J^ x iX a >
where X„. (t) =1 if t e a i and x« . (t) = if t € a i . A function f: T -» X
is said to be /^-measurable if there exists a sequence of simple
functions f
p
: T -* X such that lim|f n (t) - f(t)|| = for almost all t e T.
A ju-measurable function f: T -» X is said to be Bochner integrable if
there exists a sequence of simple functions {f
n
: n=l,2,...} such that
lim f |f n (t) - f (t)Bdji(t) =
n — oo * T-~
In this case we define for each E e t the integral to be / f(t)dji(t) =
lim
J
f n (t)dn(t). It can be shown [see Diestel-Uhl (1977), Theorem 2,
p. 45] that, if <t> : T -» X is a /j-measurable function then f is Bochner
integrable if and only if / ||f ( t) |d|i ( C) < °°. It is important to note
that the Dominated Convergence Theorem holds for Bochner integrable
functions, in particular, if f
n
: T -» X (n=l,2,...) is a sequence of
Bochner integrable functions such that limf n (t) = f(t) ^i-a.e., and
||f
n
{ t ) y <, g(t) \i-a.e., where g e L<(/i,R), then f is Bochner integrable
and lim f |f n (t) - f(t)|dj*(t) = 0.
n-~ Jr
We denote by L.(/i,X) the space of equivalence classes of X-valued
Bochner integrable functions x: T -» X normed by
|x| = f |x(t)|dn(t)
It is a standard result that normed by the functional |»| above, LJ/i,X)
becomes a Banach space [see Diestel-Uhl (1977), p. 50]. We denote by S^
the set of all selections from 4> : T -» 2 X that belong to the space
L.,(/i,X), i.e.,
S^ = {x € Li(ji,X) : x(t) 6 4>(t) ji-a.e.} ,
i.e., S^ is the set of all Bochner integrable selections from <J) ( • ) .
Using the above set and following Aumann (1965) we can define the
integral of the correspondence
<J> : T -» 2
X as follows:
j <J>(t)du(t) = || X(t)d|i(t) : X € sA
We will denote the above integral by /
<J> . Recall that the
correspondence 4> : T -» 2 is said to be inteqrably bounded if there
exists a map h e L, (/i,R) such that sup{|x||: x e <j)(t)} < h(t) /j-a.e.
Moreover, note that if T is a complete measure space, X is a separable
Banach space and <J> : T -* 2 X is an integrably bounded, nonempty valued
correspondence having a measurable graph, then by the Aumann measurable
selection theorem we can conclude that S^ is nonempty and therefore
J T
4> (t )d/j ( t ) is nonempty as well. If in addition to the fact that
<}> : T -» 2 X is integrably bounded and nonempty it is also weakly compact
and convex valued then by Diestel's Theorem [see for instance Yannelis
(1991), Theorem 3.1] we can conclude that S^ is weakly compact in
We close this section by defining the notion of a martingale and
stating the martingale convergence theorem. Let I be a directed set and
let {/-: iel} be a monotone increasing net of sub-a-fields of r (i.e.,
^ c ^ for i
1
< i
2 ,
i
1
, i2 in I ) . A net {x- : iel} in L.,(/j,X) is a
martingale if
E(xJ^", ) = x, for all i 2 L.
We will denote the above martingale by {x-,/r}- .. The proof of the
following martingale convergence theorem can be found in Diestel-Uhl
(1977, p. 126). A martingale {*j /•?",• }j c i in l"\(V>*) converges in the
L
1
(/j,X)-norm if and only if there exists x in L«(/i,X) such that
E(x|/-) = x- for all iel. Recall [see for instance Diestel-Uhl (1977,
p. 129)] that if the martingale { x j/^,}, e i converges in the L., (/j, X) -norm
to x e L.(/j,X), it also converges almost everywhere, i.e., lim x 1 =x
almost everywhere.
3. CONVERGENCE AND APPROXIMATION THEOREMS FOR
MIXED STRATEGY BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIA
3.1 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Nash Equilibria
Let (n,J,fj) be a complete, probability measure space, and Y be a
separable Banach space. As previously, a Bayesian game
G = { (X- , u- , J- ,/j) : i=l,2,...n} is a set of quadruples such that:
(1) X- : Q -» 2 Y is the random strategy correspondence of
player i,
n
(2) u i : Q x ] [ Yj - R is the random payoff function of player i,
3-1
(3) f- is the private information set of player i, where / is a
(finite, measurable) partition of (Si, J),
(4) /j is a probability measure on (Q,J) denoting the common
prior of each player.
One may allow for different priors as follows: Let q- : fl-»R++ be a
Radon-Nikodym derivative (density function) denoting the prior of
agent i. For each i=l,...,n, denote by E-(u) the event in / containing
the realized state of nature uefi and suppose that / q i (t)d(i(t) >0.
Given E-(u) e f- define the conditional expected utility of agent i as
follows:
f u1 (t f xi (t))qi (t|Ei (o))d|i(t) >
where
(continued. .
.
)
10
Denote by Lx the set of all Bochner integrable and J- -measurable
selections from the set-valued function X-: Q -» 2 Y , i.e.,
L
x
= {x
£
eLj(|i,Y): x- : ft -» Y is /--measurable and x-(u) e X^(u) /u-a.e.}.
n
Let Lx = ] J Lx , and LXi = ] J Lx . Denote the elements of Lx by x-. The
i =1 j *i
expected payoff of player i is a function v-: Lx -» S defined by
vi (x) - ju1 (o # x(«»))d|i(fi»)
The strategy x e Lx is said to be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the
Bayesian game G = { (X- ,u- ,/• ,/i) : i=l,2,...,n} if for all i, ( i=l, 2,...,n)
Vi (x*) = max v^x^Xt) .
Note that x e Lx implies that each x. is /--measurable and therefore
the vector x = (x ,x
_, ...,x ) is V .^-measurable.
1 2 n i-i
Suppose that G = { (X- ,u- ,/ ,/j) : i=l,2,...,n} satisfies the following
assumptions for all i, ( i=l,2,...,n) .
(a. 3.1) X-: Q -» 2 Y is integrably bounded, weakly compact,
convex, nonempty valued and /--lower measurable
correspondence
,
( . . .continued)
q^^ (<•>)) = <
{ if t €E i (&>)
qi(t) ift€E<(a>)
All the results of the paper remain valid if we use the above
conditional expected utility formulation. However, for the simplicity
of the exposition we do not do so.
11
n
(a. 3. 2) for each o e Q, u-(o),') is weakly continuous on [ Yj
,
j-i
n
and for each x e
] [
Y jr Uj(*,x) is /-measurable,
j-i
(a. 3 . 3 ) for each u e Q, and each Stt € Y± = ] [ Yj, u- (u,x- ,x- ) is
a concave function of x- on Y,
(a. 3. 4) u- is integrably bounded.
It was shown in Yannelis-Rustichini (1991) that under the assumptions
(a. 3 . 1) -(a. 3.4) the game G = { (X- ,u- ,/- ,fj) : i=l,2,...,n} has a (mixed
strategy) Bayesian Nash eguilibrium.
3.2 Learning
Let T be any directed set (countable or uncountable) denoting the
time horizon . Denote by o(u-,X-) the a-algebra that the random payoff
function and random strategy set of player i generate. This is the
initial information of agent i. However, the private information set of
player i at time teT, is not only a(u-,X) but also the information that
past period Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies (denoted by x c * for
1 1t < t, t, t in T) have generated. Hence the private information set
of player i at time t is defined as:
<
3 * 1 ) 9\ = a(u i ,X i , {x
cl
: t 1 < t}) .
The private information set of player i in period t > t will be
^t = <^Va({x c ': t <> t' < t }), and consequently, for each player i and
each time period t' we have that:
<
3 ' 2 ) &t c 9\" for t' <; t°, t', t° in T.
12
The expression (3.2) represents a learning process for player i.
A learning process generates a net of Bayesian games {G t : teT},
where G x = { (X-,u-,/.,/i) : i=l, 2 , ... , n} . As previously,
(1) X- : Q -* 2 Y is the random strategy set of player i,
n
(2) u L : Q x ] [ Yj - R is the random payoff function of player i,
j-i
(3) f. is the private information set of player i at time t,
given by the expression (3.1), and
(4) fi is the common prior of each player.
Let L
Xjt = {x- e L^(fu,Y): x- is A-measurable and x-(u) e X-(u) ^-a.e.}.
n
Set Lx t = ] [ Lx t. Define the expected utility of player i, v i : Lx t - R by
Vi(x) = fu i ((i),x(o>) )d\i (<•>)
The interpretation of the above dynamic game is as follows: In period t
each player's strategy is based on the initial information (i.e.,
o(u-,X-)) and the information that all Bayesian Nash equilibrium
strategies have generated in the previous periods. Note that each
player doesn't form expectations for future periods but only for the
current period t. (Recall that the expected payoff is based on the
current period private information. ) However, since the private
information set of each player is increasing it follows that his/her
expected payoff is changing from period to period as a result of the
increased information. Denote by BNEfG*) the set of all Bayesian Nash
eguilibrium strategies for G 1 at time t.
13
3.3 The Full Information Bayesian Game
Let .? be the pooled information set of player i over the entire
time horizon T, i.e., J^ = V 3>\ . (Note that V &\ denotes the "join"
of the .t. , i.e., the minimal a-algebra containing all .7. . ) The Bayesian
game G = { (X- , u- , / ,/j) : i=l,2,...,n} where u^, /j are defined as previously
but X- is now /--measurable, is called the full information Bayesian
game . Denote by BNE(G) the set of all Bayesian Nash equilibrium
n
strategies for the game G, i.e. , x e BNE(G) implies that x * € L% =
] J Ljj
i-l
and for all i,
v t (x') = max vjx^x')
x i €LxV
3.4 Remarks
3.4.1: As we discussed above, the expression (3.2) represents a
learning process. However, this is not the only way to generate a
learning process. We now follow some ideas of McKelvey-Page (1986) and
define an alternative learning process as follows:
n
Let f : J Lx - R be interpreted as a publicly observable
i-l
statistic. For each teT if x* e BNE(G t ) then the statistic f conveys
information specified as a(f(x t )), i.e., the smallest o-field with
respect to which f(x x ) is measurable. This information refines the
information already available to each player at time t, i.e., up to time
teT, the information available to each player i, is given by
30bviously, L
x is the set {x,- e L(/i,Y): each x- is ?• -measurable
and x-(g>) e X(u) p-a.e.}.
14
(3.4.1) &\ = o(u
i
,X
i , {f (x
cl
) : t^t}),
where a({f (x c ) : t x <t}) is the publicly known information up to (but not
including) period t. Note that a(f(x r ) is not contained in ST., but for
t° > t, &*i = &\ V a( {f (x c ') : t <> t' < t } ) and a(f (x z ) ) is contained in
&\ . Hence we have the following learning process, for each player i,
( 3 - 4 - 2 ) y*' c 7l for t' ^ t°, t',t°inT.
It should be noted that for each iel, &\ = 9\ for all t > t 1 if
and only if for at least one seT, s > t 1 , a({f(x r : r<s}) c
a({f(x r ): r<t } ) . In this case the publicly observed statistic does not
convey any new information after period t 1 and the learning process of
each player stops. As a result x cl eBNE(G c ) for all periods t > t 1
,
since the information structure does not change after period t 1 .
In other words, the evolution of the information partitions [i.e.,
the learning process represented by the expression (3.4.2)] stops if and
only if the information conveyed by the publicly observable statistic is
common knowledge to all players. Now if we define ^ = V &\ where each
t€T
3>. is as in (3.4.1), then for each i,
<
3 - 4 - 3 ) ^ = o(u i ,X 1 , {f (x c ) : t€T}) .
Thus, in the limit the information conveyed by the statistic f is common
knowledge. That is, players have enough information to predict the
statistic. In this respect, the strategy vector for the limiting game
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has the flavor of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium [see also
McKelvey-Page (1986, p. 122)].
Notice that even in the full information Bayesian game, agents may
have different information partitions. However, the asymmetry in
information partitions expressed by (3.4.3) persists as long as the
statistic f does not convey any new information. Hence, the term full
information Bayesian game refers to the fact that players have learned
all the information that can be conveyed by the statistic f which
aggregates the information available to each player. For example, if
o(f (x fc )) = V^* then x z is a fully revealing BNE for the game G*, and in
i=l
this case for t' > t the information partition of each agent will be the
same and therefore in the full information Bayesian game G players will
have symmetric information.
3.4.2: If in the full information game G, we assume that Q is a
finite set and that each player has a finite set of strategies X-, then
the concept of BNE or Bayesian rationality coincides with the correlated
equilibrium [Aumann (1987)]. In this specific setting we can
conclude that Bayesian rational learning will lead to correlated
equilibrium.
Nyarko (1992) has also shown that Bayesian learning leads to
correlated equilibrium. His model, however, is different than ours
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3.5 Theorems
Theorem 3.5.1 ; Let {G t : teT} be a net of Bayesian games satisfying
(a. 3. l)-(a. 3.4) and let {x*: teT} be a net in BNE(G t ). Then we can
extract a sequence {x nt : n t = l,2,...} from the net {x*: teT} such that x nt
,
* —
converges weakly to x e BNE(G).
Theorem 3.5.2 : Let {G t : teT} be a net of Bayesian games satisfying the
assumptions (a. 3. l)-(a. 3.4) and let x e BNE(G). Then there exists a
net of strategies {x t : teT} such that x t e BNE(G t ) and x l converges (in
the L
1 (ij, Y) -norm) to x .
3.6 Approximate Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
Given an e > 0, the strategy x e L
x
is said to be an approximate
or s-BNE for the Bayesian game G = { (X- ,u- ,J- ,fj) : i=l,2,...,n} if for
all i,
v i (x*) £ vi (xi ,Stl) ~ E f°r a11 x i e LXi-
This concept of an approximate BNE has been widely discussed in the
literature [e.g., Radner (1980)]. The justification of this notion is
that it may be too costly to find the exact optimal response than a
"nearly" optimal one [Radner (1980, p. 153)]. The latter may be viewed
as a kind of bounded rationality. Denote by BNE
£
(G) the set of all
approximate or e-BNE strategies for the game G. We now obtain the
counterparts of Theorems 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 for the case of an approximate
BNE.
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Theorem 3.6.1 ; Let {G*: teT} be a net of Bayesian games satisfying
(a. 3. l)-( 1. 3.4) and let {x t : teT} be a net in BNE t (G r ), where e r lO.
Then we can extract a seguence {x nc : n t = l,2,...} from the net {x t : teT}
such that x nt converges weakly to x e BNE(G).
Theorem 3.6.2 : Let {G* : teT} be a net of Bayesian games satisfying
(a. 3. 1) -(a. 3. 4) and let x* e BNE(G). Then for each net {e
t
: teT}
bounded away from zero, there exists a net of strategies {x t : teT} in
BNE
e
(G c ) such that x* converges (in the L
1
(/j, Y ) -norm) to x .
Theorem 3.6.1 indicates that even approximate BNE will converge to
the (exact) full information BNE. This theorem gives as a corollary
Theorem 3.5.I. 5 It is important to note that Theorem 3.6.2 has an
interesting interpretation. In particular, it shows that an (exact)
full information BNE can be achieved by a path of plays by agents who
have bounded rationality, i.e., this path of plays constitutes an
approximate BNE for each period.
4. PURE STRATEGY BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM CONVERGENCE
AND APPROXIMATION THEOREMS
In this section will derive the counterparts of Theorems 3.5.1 and
3.5.2 for a pure strategy Bayesian Nash eguilibria for the game G.
Previously the strategy set of each player i, i.e., X-, was assumed to
5Despite the fact that Theorem 3.5.1 can be obtained as a corollary
of Theorem 3.6.1 we have tried to separate the cases that Bayesian
rational learning leads to the full information BNE (Theorem 3.5.1) and
that e-Bayesian rational (or bounded rational) learning leads to the
full information BNE (Theorem 3.6.1), because we believe that both cases
are of interest. Perhaps, the experimental work will indicate which
kind of learning is more appropriate. Some recent work in this
direction is reported in the papers of El-Gamal-McKelvey-Palfrey (1992)
and Rustichini-Villamil (1992 and 1992a).
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be a set-valued function from Q to Y. We now set Y = Rm . Now each /
will be a sub-a-algebra of (Q,/) and the restriction of fj to /. will be
still denoted by ij. We denote by ext X t the extreme points of X-
.
(Recall that in this setting pure strategies are identified with extreme
points.
)
Formally, a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the game
n
*
G = {Xj,uw /j f /i)s i=l,2,...,n} is an x*: - ] J Y t such that each x. is
i-l '
/.-measurable x.(u) e ext X.(u) /j-a.e. and for all i, ( i=l, 2 , ..., n)
,
fu i ( o> , x * ( o> ) ) dp. ( (i) ) ^ fUj ( a) , x t ( o) ) , x[ ( 10 ) ) dn ( 0) )
for any /--measurable function x-: n -* Y-, x.(G)) e ext X- (u) ^-a.e.
The following assumptions guarantee the existence of a pure
strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the game G [see Yannelis-
Rustichini (1991) ]
.
(a. 4.1) For each i, (fi,/. ,^j) is a complete, atomless probability
measure space,
(a. 4. 2) For each i, X t : Q - 2 R" is an integrably bounded, compact,
convex, nonempty valued and /-lower measurable
correspondence
,
(a. 4. 3) For each i, and each uen, u.(g>,*) is linear and continuous
n
on J Yj = R"
111 and it is also integrably bounded.
3-1
As in Section 3.2 we can similarly recast the idea of learning.
The only difference now is that the private information set of agent i
at time t depends on the information he/she has acquired from past
19
period Bayesian Nash equilibrium pure strategies still denoted by
x
Cl
,x
C2
,... . Everything else remains the same.
Denote by PBNE(G t ) the set of all pure strategy Bayesian Nash
equilibria for G t at time t, and by PBNE(G) the set of all pure
strategies Bayesian Nash equilibria for the full information Bayesian
Nash equilibrium game G.
Theorem 4.1 ; Let {G*: teT} be a net of Bayesian games satisfying
(a. 4. l)-(a.4. 3) and let {x l : teT} be a net in PBNE(G t ). Then we can
extract a sequence {x nc : n
c
= l,2,...} from the net {x x : teT} such that x nc
converges weakly to x e PBNE(G).
Theorem 4.2 ; Let {G l : teT} be a net of Bayesian games satisfying
(a.4.1)-(a.4.3) and let x* e PBNE(G). Then there exists a net of
strategies {x t : teT} such that x* e PGNE(G) and x z converges (in the
L
1
(^,Rm )-norm) to x*.
We conclude this section by mentioning that the counterparts of
Theorems 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 for the case of pure strategies can be readily
obtained. Since we have outlined the proofs of Theorems 3.6.1 and 3.6.2
in Section 6, we leave the proof for the case of pure strategies to the
reader, in order to avoid repetition.
5. PROOF OF THE THEOREMS
We begin with a few observations. Note that since each Uj is
integrably bounded and weakly continuous it follows from the Lebesgue
dominated convergence theorem that each v- is weakly continuous [Fact
4.2 in Yannelis-Rustichini (1991)]. Moreover, since each u- is concave
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in the i th coordinate so is v.. For each i, ( i=l, 2 , ..., n) define
P 4 : L x - 2
Lxi by
Pi(x) = {y 1 € LXi : v^y^iCi) > vL (x) } .
It follows from the weak continuity of v- that P,- has a weakly open
graph (i.e., the set Gp = {(x,y i ) e Lx x Lx : y t € P t (x) } is weakly open in
Lx x Lx ) . Also from the concavity of v- in the i th coordinate it follows
that P- is convex valued. Since each X- is /-lower measurable and
compact valued, it has a measurable graph. By the Aumann measurable
selection theorem there exists an 7j -measurable function f - : Q-»Y such
that fj(u) e X-(u) /j-a.e. Since X
i
is integrably bounded f- e L.,(/j,Y)
n
and therefore each set Lx is nonempty and so is J Lx = Lx . Clearly
i-i
each Lx is convex and therefore L x is convex as well. By Diestel's
theorem [see Theorem 3.1 in Yannelis (1991)] Lx is a weakly compact
subset of L^(fj,Y). Hence the set Lx is weakly compact, convex and
nonempty. Finally notice that for t 1 > t 2
,
(t^t 2 in T) we have that
L t 2 c L c i, i.e., as information increases the strategy set of each
x i x i
player expands.
With all these preliminary observations out of the way we can
begin the proof of Theorem 3.5.1.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 3.5.1
Let {x*: teT} be a net in BNE(G t ), (i.e., x t € Lx c and
P i (x
t
) fl Lx t - <|> for all i, or equivalently x c 6 Lx t and for all i,
v i (x
t
) = max vi (y i ,x i
t
) ). For simplicity let us denote the net
{x t : teT} by B. As we observed above the set Lx t is weakly compact and
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nonempty. Since for each teT, x c 6 Lx t and L x t is weakly compact it
follows that the weak closure of the set B denoted by u)-c.2 B, is weakly
compact. By the Eberlein-Smulian Theorem [ Dunford-Schwartz (1958,
p. 430)], o)-c£ B is weakly sequentially compact. Clearly the weak limit
of x ( , denoted by x , belongs to u-c£ B. From Whitley's theorem
[ Aliprantis-Burkinshaw (1985, Lemma 10.12, p. 155)] we know that if
x e g>-c£ B then there exists a sequence {x mt 6 L
x
m t : mt = l,2,...} such that
x
mt converges weakly to x . (For notational convenience we drop the
subscript t from the superscript m
t
and denote the above sequence simply
by {xm : m=l,2,...}.) Since &\ c ^ for t 1 > t we have that Lx >. c lx , and
since each xm is in Lx » £ Lx , it follows that x* t Lx . Hence, for each i,
*
_ _
x. is an /-measurable selection from X- . To complete the proof we must
show that
(5.1.1) Pi(x*) L^ = 4> for all i.
Suppose otherwise, i.e., for some i, P^x*) L
x
* <j> • Choose
y i € P^x*) D L^, then v^y^Xi*) > v^x') . Let
(5.1.2) e = V .(y. t x^) - Vl (x') > 0.
For each m, (m=l,2,...) set y™ = EJyJ^] € Lx™ . Note that
E[yi |.?T] = E[E[yi |.^T
+1
]|ir]
= Efyri^l.
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Hence, {Yi"/ ^i}"., is a martingale in Lx » c L x (n,Y) and by the martingale
convergence theorem, Vi" converges (in the L.(/j,Y) norm) and thus weakly
to y- . It follows (recall that v
(
is weakly continuous) that we can
choose m
1
large enough so that for m > m
1
we have
Iv^y^x;) - v i (y in, ,x im ) | < e/2 and Iv^x") - vt (x*) | < e/2.
Thus
|vr (yi ,Xi*) - v i (y i
m
,x 1
m
) + vi (x m ) - Vi (x')| <;
IvJy^xO - v1 (y i
m
,x1
ra
)| |v± (x-) -v^x')! <
e/2 + e/2.
Then in view of (5.1.2) we have
v^y^Xi') -v i (y im ,x im ) + v i (x m ) -v^x') <v(y i/ x i') - v t (xi)
and by rearranging we obtain
v^y", x") > v^x 1") for all m ;> m,,
a contradiction to the fact that x m lies in BNE(G m ) . The above
contradiction establishes the validity of (5.1.1), i.e., P i (x*) H L^ . = <J>
for all i, or equivalently v l {k*) = max v i (y i , Xi) for all i. This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.5.1.
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5.2 Proof of Theorem 3.5.2
Let x be in BNE(G), i.e., x e Lx and P i (x) D Lx = <t> for all i (or
equivalently x e Lx and v i {x) = rnax v i (y i ,x i ) for all i). We will
construct a net x z in BNE(G t ) such that x* converges (in the L«(/i,Y)
norm) to x e BNE(G). To this end for each i, ( i = l , 2 , ..., n) and each
t in T set Xi = E[x ± |^i] . Note that
E[Xi|^t] = EJEfxil^ 1]!^] for tj.it
= Efxt'l^i] for tj k t.
Hence by construction {x^, &\} is a martingale in Lx t c L 1 (n,Y) and by
the martingale convergence theorem x. converges (in the L
1
(fu, Y) -norm) to
x- for all i, ( i=l,2,...,n) . To complete the proof we must show that
x f = (x ,...,x ) lies in the set BNE(G t ). Suppose otherwise, i.e.,
n
x
t £ BNE(G t ) for some teT, then x t 6 ] [ Lx t = Lx t and P^x 6 ) D Lx i * 4>, for
i-l
some player i, or equivalently x c € Lx <. and there exists y^ 6 Lx <. such
that
(5*2.1) v^y^, x^) > v^xM .
For each i ( i=l, 2 , ..., n) , define the set K- = {teT: there exists y^ 6 Lx t
t t n
such that v,(y ,x ) > v.(x r )}. Notice that for t€T\ U K< , we have that
1
i i ' i-i
x t e BNE(G t ). If for each i, K- is a finite or empty set then the net
x fc : teT\ U K
A
/ belongs to BNE(G t ) and by construction x l converges to x,
i-i J
in which case the proof is complete. Hence all we need to show is that
the set Kj cannot be infinite,
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To this end suppose that for some i, K,- is an infinite set. Then
for t e X- we have a net {y.} having the property that
v-(y.,x.) > v-(x t ). Notice that y^ € Lx <. c Lx and the set Lx is weakly
compact (recall Diestel's theorem). Hence, we can find a subnet still
denoted by {y.: t e K- } which converges weakly to yi e Lx . . As we noted
above for each i, x. converges (in the L. (fj, Y)-norm) and therefore
weakly to x-. Since v- is weakly continuous taking weak limits in the
inequality (5.2.1) we obtain
vL (y i ,Sti ) > Vi(x) for y L € L^.,
or equivalently y± € P i (x) H Lj. , i.e., P L (x) flLj, * <|> for some player i.
But this contradicts the original supposition that x lies in the set
BNE(G). This contradiction establishes that x* e BEN(G t ) and the proof
of Theorem 3.5.2 is now complete.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 3.6.1
For each i, ( i=l, 2 ,...,n) and each e > 0, define P": L^-^2 Xl by
Pi(x) = {yi^Lx.: v i (y i ,x i ) > vL (x) + e} .
Let {x t : teT} be a net in BNE
t
(G t ), i.e., x c 6Lx t and for all i,
P i
t (x t ) H Lx t = 4>. Adopting the argument in the proof of Theorem 3.5.1
we can extract a sequence {x nt : n
c
= l,2,...} from the net {x t : teT} such
that x nt converges weakly to x'6Lj, To complete the proof we must show
that x* e BNE(G), i.e.,
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P: (x*) L^ = 4> for all i.
Suppose otherwise, i.e., for at least one i, P^x*) (1 L^ *
<J) . Let
yL 6 P^x*) Lji# then v t (y^Xi*) - v t (x*) > 0. Set
(5-3.1) Vity^xi) - v^x') = 6.
For each m, (m=l,2,...) set yf = E [y, \&ft = E [E [yJ^T*1 ] |5*T] - Ely?*1 !*?] .
Thus, {yT/^Dm-i is a martingale in Lx » c L x (n,Y) and by the martingale
convergence theorem y. converges (in the L. (jj, Y ) -norm and therefore
weakly) to y.. By the weak continuity of v- we can choose m. large
enough so that for m > m. we have that
|vi(yi,*i) " vi (y1" ,,*i1,)| < A-i!
and
Iv^x"1 ) - vi (x*) I < ^
Recall that e t 10 and so does the sequence em . Thus,
Iv^y^Xi*) - v i (y i
m
,x i
,n
) + Vi (x m ) - Vi (x*)|
<; Iv^y^Xi*) - v^yf^r) | + KU 1") - v t (x*) | < 6 - e n
In view of (5.3.1) we have
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v^y^x*) - Vityr,*?) + v1 (x ni ) -v^x') <v i (y i ,x') -v^x') - em
and by rearranging we obtain that
Vi(yr,Xim ) > v^x") + em for all mam1#
a contradiction to the fact that x m € BNE, (G m ) . Hence, we can conclude
that P i (x*) D Lx = 4> for all i, i.e., x* e BNE(G). This completes the
proof of Theorem 3.6.1.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 3.6.2
Let x be in BNE(G), i.e., x e L^ and P L (x) H L^ = 4> for all i. We
will construct a net {x t : teT} in BNE
e
(G c ) such that x c converges (in
the L
1 (fj, Y)-norm) to x. For each i, ( i=l,2,...,n) and each t in T set
Xi
C
= E[Xi|^i] . Note that
E[x
i
|i^] = EfEfxJ.^ 1 ] \S\] for t^t
= Etx^l^t] for t^t.
Hence {x* , &\] teT is a martingale in Lx c Lx (|i f Y) and by the martingale
convergence theorem x. converges in the L
1
(/j, Y)-norm and hence weakly to
x.- . To complete the proof we must show that x* = (x , ... ,x ) lies in
1 1 n
BNE
8t
(G t ) for any net{c
t
: teT} bounded away from zero such that e t le,
(e>0). For each i, define the set K L = {teT: ?lt (x t ) f) Lx t * $} . Notice
that for t€T\UKi we have that x G BNE. (G c ). If for each i, K- is a
i-i
x et '
finite or empty set there is nothing to prove. Hence to complete the
proof we need to show that for each i, K- cannot be infinite. To this
end
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suppose that for some i, K- is infinite. Then the net {y.: teK-} has
the property that,
(5.4.1) Viiy^xf) > Vi (x c ) + e t .
Note that yj_ e Lx t c lx and the set Lx is weakly compact. Hence, we can
find a subset still denoted by {y.: teK-} such that y. converges weakly
to y i € Lx • By the weak continuity of v- taking weak limits in the
inequality (5.4.1) we obtain that v i (y i ,x i ) £ v t (x) + e. Thus, we can
conclude that yA € P i (x) H Lx . for some player i, a contradiction to the
supposition that x lies in BNE(G).
5.5 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We begin with some preparatory observations and facts. Denote by
Lextx the set {x- e L«(/J,Rm ): x-: Q -» R
m is /--measurable and
x-(w) e extX^u) ^-a.e.}. Define the mapping i|r: L^(/j,Rm ) -» Rm by
ijr(z) = { z ( u ) d/j ( to ) . Denote the integral of the set-valued function
ext X
t
: Q -2*™ by jextX i which in turn is equal to i|f(Lextx ) =
n
{i|f (z) : z € Lextx .} . Set f extX = JJ f extX^ Let [extSq = JJ [extXj andJ i-l J J i*j
denote the points of Text X t by x i . Since by (a. 4. 3) for each uefi,
n
u- (a,*) is linear on [ Y j = '^im tne domain of the expected utility of
j-i
n
each agent i, i.e., g^x) = Ju- (ti>,x(a>) )d/j((i>) is now jX = ] /X^
* i-i J
However, we will show that the set
J
X is equal to f extX. To this end
first note that since each X- is compact and convex valued, by the
standard Krein-Milman-Minkowski theorem we have that
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(5.5.1) con(extXi(u)) =X1 («) jx-a.e.
By Theorem 5.3 in Himmelberg (1975) extX^-) is lower measurable and so
is conextX^-). Integrating (5.5.1) we obtain:
(5.5.2) /"context Xi) = fx± .
Since by assumption the measure space (Q,/-,/lO is atomless by Theorem 3
of Aumann (1965) we have that:
(5.5.3) fcorKextXi) = f extX i .
Combining (5.5.2) and (5.5.3) we have that for each i,
J
ext X £ = f X L and
we conclude that fX = f extX.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.5.1 for each i, define
P± : fextX - 2/
extXl by
(5.5.4) P
t (x) = {y L e |extX i: 2L (yt , XJ > g t (x)} .
It follows from the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem that g, is
(norm) continuous on jext X (recall that by (a. 4. 3) for each wen u-(u,»)
is continuous and integrably bounded) . Moreover, since by assumption
for each coefi, u- (&»,•) is linear so is g- . But since g- is norm continuous
and linear it is also weakly continuous [Dunford-Schwartz (Theorem 15,
p. 422)]. Hence, P- has a weakly open graph in JextX i x JextX.
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Finally note that by claim 5.1 in Yannelis-Rustichini (1991), | extX is
weakly compact and nonempty.
With all these preliminaries out of the way we can now complete
the proof of Theorem 4.1. As a matter of fact the argument from now on
is identical to the one adopted for the proof of Theorem 3.5.1 and we
will only outline it. Let {x* : teT} be a net in PBNE(G t ) / i.e.,
x t € fextX t and for all i, g i (x t ) = ™ax g i (y 1 ,x i
c ). As noted
J YiEJextX?
above, / ext
X
t is weakly compact. Hence, by adopting the argument of
Theorem 3.5.1 we can extract a sequence {z : m=l,2,...} from the net
{x c : teT} such that z tm converges weakly to x * 6 Text X t c fextX, i.e.,
*
for each i, x. is /--measurable selection from ext X
4
. To complete the
proof one must show that P i (x*) D j extX i = <(> for all i. An identical
argument with that used in Theorem 3.5.1 can be now adopted to complete
the proof of Theorem 4.1.
5.6 Proof of Theorem 4.2
As in the proof of Theorem 4.1 we have that |X = f ext X and the
latter set is weakly compact and nonempty. Moreover, the set-valued
function P
L
: f ext X - 2*
e
'
! defined as in (5.5.4) has a weakly open
graph. Let x now be in PBNE(G), i.e., xefextX and for all i,
g L (x) = max g^Yi/X^ . Using an identical argument as in
y ± efextXi
Theorem 3
.
5 . 2 one can construct a net x t in PBNE (G*) such that x 1-
converges (in the L^(f2,Y) norm) to x in PBNE(G).
H-NY.5-40
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